Specimen

DemoCompany, across a thousand futures.

DemoCompany is a fictional business examined with the method Brenwick uses on real ones, published in full so the reasoning can be inspected before anyone requests a report.

Why a fictional company

Client work is confidential and stays that way. That leaves a public research library with an awkward problem: the examinations worth reading are the ones nobody is allowed to see.

So this one was built to be published. DemoCompany is not a real business. It is a pre-seed B2B SaaS company invented for the purpose — detailed enough to behave like one, complete enough to carry an examination from the first assumption to a signed answer. Every figure on this page is simulated demonstration data.

What is real is the method. The same reconstruction, the same uncertain inputs, the same single question asked at a single date, and the same pair of reports a client receives at the end. Read the company as scaffolding. The method is the thing on display.

Exhibit 1 The company

Meet DemoCompany

The plan, as written — nine facts, all of them standing still. The other view keeps the company and lets them move. The same company, across one thousand futures. Six of the nine facts stop holding still.

The business

B2B SaaS · 3 tiers

€0 · €1k · €3k a month. Three paying customers today, €5k a month between them.

Cash on hand

€390k

In the bank on 1 January 2026.

The team today

4 people

R&D, Sales, Admin, Support — 3.4 full-time equivalents, €285k a year including employer contributions.

Hiring plan

9 more hires 5 – 9 hires

5 at worst 7 likely 9 max

Staggered from February 2026 to March 2027. Charlie (R&D) is first on the plan. Three of the nine only happen if another hire lands first. Charlie's start slides anywhere from December 2025 to June 2026.

Growth engine

~0.5 signups a day 0 – 1.4 a day

0 0.46 median 1.4

Self-serve only, no sales team. Signups land on the free tier — revenue starts later, if they upgrade. One run in twenty draws a rate of zero. In those futures the funnel never starts at all.

Upgrade & churn

~7% upgrade a month 2% – 12% a month

2% all equally likely 12%

Free users move up to €1k at about 7% a month. Paying customers leave at 5 to 7% a month. No point in this band is likelier than any other. The plan holds no evidence that would prefer one.

The raise

€250k seed85% likely

2 Mar any day, equally 30 Jun

Closes 1 May 2026. Any closing date between March and June 2026 is as likely as any other. In 15 futures out of 100 it never closes, and the company runs the horizon without it.

Debt

€22k left, €200k to come

What remains of a €50k bridge at 9%, repaid by September 2026. A €200k bank loan at 6.5% draws in January 2027. The bridge is fixed. The €200k draws on 27 January 2027, give or take three weeks.

Overhead & kit

~€4k a month

Rent €3,000, software €800, insurance €200. Laptops and servers as the team grows. Steady, plus a €5,000 audit fee somewhere in June 2026.

Figures read from the model behind the sample report pair · 1,000 runs · 1 Jan 2026 to 31 Jul 2027 brenwick

Source

Every figure is an input to the model, not an output of it.

SPECIMEN · Demo company

What the model was asked

An examination answers one question at one date. The question has to be written down before the model runs — otherwise the answer is whichever number the output happens to flatter.

Here the question is a condition, written down before the model runs rather than chosen after it: “Cash balance below zero at month-end”. One line, one date — the Anchor, 2027-07-31, nineteen months into a plan that begins on 1 January 2026. Everything else the model produces is scenery; this is the thing it has to answer.

That is deliberately narrow. The examination does not ask whether DemoCompany is a good company, whether the plan is ambitious, or whether the team can sell. It asks how often, across a thousand runs of the same business, the cash balance is below zero when the month closes on that date.

What came back

The condition was met in 32% of the runs at the Anchor — 324 runs met it, 676 did not.

Read it plainly: one future in three closes that month with an empty account. That is not a doomed company and it is not a safe one — it is a plan with a one-in-three failure mode sitting inside it, nineteen months out, visible now while there is still time to act on it.

No plan in a spreadsheet can show that. Not because the arithmetic is harder — because a cell holds one value, so the file holds one future: the one somebody typed in. Change three assumptions and it does not put a second outcome beside the first, it replaces it. The other futures never appear, which is not the same as not existing.

The plan is one of those futures — a real one, and the one worth writing down first. The 324 where the account is empty at the Anchor came out of assumptions nobody could have ruled out either, and they were there before anybody modelled them. What changes is that they now show up on the radar while the decision is still open, and specific enough to act on: which hire, which threshold, which month.

For an investor that is a measure of how much of the plan's value rests on things going better than the middle case. For a founder it is a figure to argue with instead of a mood to manage.

What separates the two cohorts

Split the runs into the 324 that met the condition and the 676 that did not, then compare the two groups input by input. What comes back is a ranking of the inputs that took visibly different values on each side of the line. Two stood clear of the rest.

The daily signup rate is first. The median run draws 0.46 signups a day and sits at the overall 32% rate. Among the runs that ran above 0.64 signups a day, only 15% met the condition — the frequency roughly halves. It is also the harder of the two to move from inside the company: the lever behind it is top-of-funnel, which means acquisition spend, partnerships, and word of mouth.

Free-to-paid conversion is second. At the bottom of the sampled range, 3% a month, 69% of paths met the condition; above 8% a month it falls to 19%. This one is internal — onboarding, activation, and how the tiers are priced — which makes it the cheaper of the two to work on even though it separates the cohorts less sharply.

Three more inputs separate the cohorts behind those two, and one of them is not a growth number at all. The forensic report ranks all five and puts a threshold on each.

What this does not say

This is the section to read twice. The comparison behind those numbers is observational. It takes the runs the model produced, sorts them by what happened at the Anchor, and reports how the two groups differed. No intervention was tested: nothing was held fixed while one input was moved and the rest of the future left alone.

That distinction decides what the numbers can be used for. A driver can travel with the outcome without causing it. The runs with low signup rates are also the runs where revenue arrives late, where the raise is worth less by the time it lands, and where every new hire meets a thinner base. The signup rate marks all of that at once, and telling the marker apart from the mechanism takes a different test than this one.

So the honest reading of the first driver is this: runs in which signups ran above 0.64 a day were runs in which the condition was met far less often. The reading it is not: push signups above 0.64 a day and the risk halves. The second may well be true. This examination does not establish it, and a report that implied otherwise would be selling a conclusion it had not earned.

Establishing it is separate work — the same futures cloned, one input changed, everything else left where it was. That step belongs to an engagement, with a human deciding which change is worth testing and what the result means. It is not what this page shows.

The forecast that survives a slipped month

Ask a founder what happens when a September order lands in October. The answer is usually a new version of the plan — a rebuilt sheet, a fresh set of numbers, and a story explaining the gap. The order slipping was never the surprise. Rebuilding the plan around it is what makes it look like news.

That does not happen here. The possibility that the order slips is already in the model, so the month it lands in is one of the things a thousand runs disagree about. A probable event arriving does not call for a new plan; it narrows the one that exists.

Which is why the forecast half of the pair is not a projection. Its P&L and cash-flow statement are one of the thousand runs — a single coherent future, picked because its cash balance sits in the middle of them all — and the report draws around it where the other 999 went. That middle future ends the horizon with €168k in the bank. The bottom fifth of runs end €98k in the red, the top fifth with €568k. Revenue growth runs at 14% a month in the middle, and between 10% and 18% across those same fifths.

The range also says where to look. Insolvency risk peaks in July 2027, at 32% — which is the month the forensic study takes apart, and the reason the Anchor sits where it does.

And because the range is written down before the months happen, it can be checked once they have. Actuals land somewhere inside it: near the middle, or out toward an edge. That is a sharper question than whether the company hit its plan, and an investor can ask it every quarter.

Where the rest of it is

Every number above is read out of that pair, and the pair is what a client receives at the end of an engagement. DemoCompany's copy of it is the sample.

Request the sample report and both documents arrive by email.